Abstract Energy efficiency is one of the main options for mitigating climate change. An accurate representation of various mechanisms of energy efficiency is vital for the assessment of Climatic Change (2014) 123:397-411 DOI 10.1007 This article is part of the Special Issue on "The EMF27 Study on Global Technology and Climate Policy Strategies" edited by John Weyant, Elmar Kriegler, Geoffrey Blanford, Volker Krey, Jae Edmonds, Keywan Riahi, Richard Richels, and Massimo Tavoni. its realistic potential. Results of a questionnaire show that the EMF27 models collectively represent known channels of energy efficiency reasonably well, addressing issues of energy efficiency barriers and rebound effects. The majority of models, including general equilibrium models, have an explicit end-use representation for the transportation sector. All participating partial equilibrium models have some capability of reflecting the actual market behavior of consumers and firms. The EMF27 results show that energy intensity declines faster under climate policy than under a baseline scenario. With a climate policy roughly consistent with a global warming of two degrees, the median annual improvement rate of energy intensity for 2010-2030 reaches 2.3 % per year [with a full model range of 1.3-2.9 %/yr], much faster than the historical rate of 1.3 % per year. The improvement rate increases further if technology is constrained. The results suggest that the target of the United Nations' "Sustainable Energy for All" initiative is consistent with the 2-degree climate change target, as long as there are no technology constraints. The rate of energy intensity decline varies significantly across models, with larger variations at the regional and sectoral levels. Decomposition of the transportation sector down to a service level for a subset of models reveals that to achieve energy efficiency, a general equilibrium model tends to reduce service demands while partial equilibrium models favor technical substitution.
Introduction
Energy efficiency is deemed as an essential component of climate change mitigation options, particularly in the short and medium term (Morita et al. 2001; Fisher et al. 2007) . Integrated assessment models (IAMs) have shown that stringent mitigation scenarios are accompanied by a decline in energy intensity, roughly at 2 % per year in the short term (e.g., Hanaoka et al. 2009 ). Energy intensity is an economy-wide metric of energy efficiency, and defined as primary or final energy per unit gross domestic product (GDP).
Reducing the demand for energy contributes not only to mitigating global climate change, but also ameliorates other energy-related problems, such as energy security, poverty, and environmental pollution (GEA 2012) . Energy efficiency is thus now touted as one of the three pillars of Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL), an initiative led by the United Nations Secretary-General. The initiative calls for a doubling of improvements in global energy intensity up until 2030, relative to the historical rate (United Nations 2011). The required improvement rate translates into somewhere between 2.4 %/yr (IEA 2013) and 2.6 %/yr (Rogelj et al. 2013) .
However, some voiced criticisms that IAMs might be overemphasizing the potential of energy efficiency because many possible obstacles to energy efficiency may be misrepresented in models. Among such obstacles, two issues stand out from the literature: energy efficiency barriers and rebound effects.
Energy efficiency barriers refer to the various mechanisms that prevent consumers or firms from taking energy efficiency measures that are economically optimal (Sorrell et al. 2000, 2011 and references therein) . The difference between what appears to be an optimal level of cost-effective energy efficiency potential and what consumers and firms actually purchase is known as the "energy efficiency gap." For example, assuming an ideal investment condition, McKinsey & Company (2009) revealed that by 2020, the United States could potentially reduce its annual energy consumption by 10.3 quadrillion Btus 1 at a carbon price of $50/t-CO 2 . In contrast, EMF25 estimates, which took into account actual market behaviors of investors, were considerably smaller than the above study, about one-third or below, with the same carbon price (Huntington and Smith 2011; Huntington 2011) . A large body of literature has revealed a number of barriers that can potentially cause such energy efficiency gaps. There has been much debate about whether policy (e.g., information campaigns, subsidies for energy-efficient appliances, or financial arrangements that divide upfront expenditure to recurring payments) can bridge these gaps in an inexpensive way (e.g., Allcott and Greenstone 2012; Nadel and Langer 2012) .
However, even if policy could overcome barriers, an improved technical efficiency may not translate into a satisfactory reduction in energy demand, since the demand for energy services could increase in response to technical improvements and any associated fall in energy service prices. This is known as an "energy rebound effect", and it occurs on multiple scales, from consumer level to having an effect on the global economy (see Sorrell 2007 for a recent review). In an extreme case, energy efficiency improvements could increase energy demand, resulting in a "backfire."
Sorrell (2007) and Jenkins et al. (2011) suggested that in spite of the potential significance of rebound effects, they were not adequately treated in the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). On the other hand, Gillingham et al. (2013) noted that although rebound effects are not negligible, empirical estimates and theoretical considerations suggest that they are not large enough to offset efficiency gains.
Another key issue is the precise mechanism of macroeconomic energy efficiency. Hanaoka et al. (2009) observed fast declines in energy intensity in the IPCC AR4 dataset, but they were unable to attribute such reductions to either structural changes in the economy or technical improvements, because energy intensity is a macroeconomic indicator that does not distinguish these two factors.
The Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 27 is a major model intercomparison project aimed at elucidating the impact of various technology prospects (e.g., nuclear phase-out, unavailability of CCS, or low resource of bioenergy) in alternative policy settings (e.g., varying climate targets and cooperation regimes). For details, see Kriegler et al. (2013) .
The resulting database (EMF27 dataset) consists of time series of energy, economic, technology, and climate variables, both on global and regional levels. It is unique for its wide coverage of existing IAMs. The dataset gives us a great opportunity to revisit the old question about the role of energy efficiency in climate change mitigation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the state of energy efficiency modeling. Section 3 reviews the subset of EMF27 scenarios relevant to energy efficiency. Section 4 characterizes energy efficiency improvements from various perspectives. Section 5 presents conclusions and discusses remaining issues.
Model characteristics
Table 1 describes the energy efficiency characteristics of EMF27 models, based on questionnaires submitted to each participating modeling team. Various types of models participate in the EMF27. Conventionally, models have been categorized into top-down models and bottom-up models. Cost estimates from these two approaches substantially overlap (Barker et al. 2007 ), but there have been efforts to create hybrid models to overcome the issues faced by conventional models (Hourcade et al. 2006) . Although the EMF27 models can still be categorized into top-down models based on general equilibrium and bottom-up ones based on partial equilibrium, the gaps are narrowing and many of them can be considered to be some sort of hybrid models.
In representing energy efficiency, these two types of models have different features. Partial equilibrium models allow for examining the role of individual technologies, but since they do not model macroeconomic effects such as the substitution of energy against other factors such as labor and capital, their efficiency potential is somewhat limited by the modeled efficiency measures. On the other hand, general equilibrium models cannot generally elaborate on the role of distinct technologies, but its macroeconomic energy efficiency is not constrained by technology.
On the end-use side, 15 out of the 18 EMF27 models include some degree of explicit technical representation of the transportation sector. However, many general equilibrium models still lack technological details for the industry and residential and commercial sectors.
We next turn to the rebound effects, which can be classified into three types: direct, indirect, and macroeconomic. Macroeconomic effects are the most pertinent to IAMs. Jenkins et al. (2011) further elaborated on three categories of effects at the macroeconomic level: market price, composition, and economic growth effects. The first refers to an increase in energy service in response to an overall price decrease due to energy efficiency improvements. The second category describes a shift in the composition of an economy toward energy-intensive sectors because of an improvement in energy efficiency. The last category occurs when economic growth is promoted with lower energy prices, resulting in a larger demand of energy services. In theory, a general equilibrium model should encompass all three effects. Table 1 shows that many partial equilibrium models in the EMF27 represent price effects, and some also include composition effects. Since 11 of the models are based on general equilibrium, the EMF27 models collectively contain a reasonable treatment of rebound effects. However, it is necessary to know whether the size of rebound effects in IAMs is consistent with data, although estimates of macroeconomic rebound effects are scarce (Sorrell 2007) .
As with rebound effects, models do reasonably well with energy efficiency barriers, with all the partial equilibrium models having some capability. Most of them adjust hurdle rates (interest/discount rates higher than implied by the market; Howarth and Sanstad 1995) or incorporate choice models that reflect market behavior.
As we restrict ourselves mostly to the global results, GCAM-IIM is excluded from all the subsequent analyses. (Note that GCAM-IIM is virtually identical to GCAM for the purpose of Table 1 ).
Scenarios
In this paper, we focus on the following subset of EMF27 scenarios (Kriegler et al. 2013 
):
& Base FullTech: No climate policy with the full portfolio of technologies available (hence its name "FullTech") and the prescribed, reference energy intensity improvement rate of about 1.2 % per year, which is compatible with the historical rate; & 550 FullTech: As in Base FullTech but with a climate target comparable with the stabilization greenhouse gas concentration of 550 ppm-eq in CO 2 equivalents; & 450 FullTech: As in 550 FullTech but with a 450 ppm-eq target; Unlike other scenarios in the EMF27, the LowEI scenarios enhance energy efficiency, rather than constrain it. Therefore, the LowEI scenarios result in carbon prices lower than those in the FullTech scenarios.
It is also important to note that the LowEI scenarios contain a mixture of a technological option and a structural change in the economy. Although some models, such as GCAM, have modified end-use efficiencies, other models have adjusted their AEEI (autonomous energy efficiency improvement) rates to achieve the prescribed reduction of final energy demand. The LowEI scenarios are based on a different set of baseline economic assumptions. They nonetheless provide us with an opportunity to consider the implications of higher energy efficiency. Figure 1 shows energy intensity time series and the energy intensity improvement rates (EIIRs) for the two time periods (2010-2050 and 2010-2100) , juxtaposed with those from the IPCC AR4 scenario database (Hanaoka et al. 2006 (Hanaoka et al. , 2011 . IPCC AR4 created a system of categorization based on stabilization targets (Categories I-VI) (Fisher et al. 2007 ). Here we show the combined I+II and III categories, along with the reference scenarios. The corresponding stabilization greenhouse gas concentrations are 445-490 ppm-eq for Category I, 490-535 ppm-eq for Category II, and 535-590 ppm-eq for Category III.
Results

Global energy intensity improvement
Note that the solid lines in the left panel of Fig. 1 reflect only the 9 models that provide data encompassing all the six scenarios for a time horizon of 2100, to avoid a distortion in the plot.
In this paper, the EIIR is estimated with an ordinary least-squares fit to the equation:
Where FE is final energy, GDP is gross domestic/world product in market exchange rates, and t is time, in years.
EIIRs for the baselines (Base FullTech and Base LowEI) are prescribed. As shown in the left panel of Fig. 1 , the Base FullTech scenario roughly follows the historical trend (see also the far-left column of the right panel of Fig. 1 ). The Base LowEI scenario is designed to have a 25 % lower energy consumption in 2050, and shows a median EIIR of 2.00 % per year [full range: 1.70-2.46 %/yr] (the fourth column from the left in the left panel of Fig. 1 ).
An improvement of energy intensity is accelerated under climate policy, particularly up until 2050. Fig. S3 ), which is much higher than the global historical rate of 1.3 % per year and close to the SE4ALL goal of 2.4-2.6 % per year.
There are differences between the EMF27 results and the IPCC database. The Base FullTech scenario shows larger improvements than the reference scenarios in the IPCC AR4. The 550 FullTech is accompanied by an energy intensity decline comparable to that of IPCC AR4 Category III. The Category I+II from IPCC AR4 exhibits an EIIR lower than Category III. This issue has already been documented by Hanaoka et al. (2009) , and is quite different from the 450 FullTech results. It is noteworthy that due to the limited availability of data, the number of models from IPCC AR4 is very small, and there are only 7 scenarios for Category III, and 8 for Category I+II. It is possible that the AR4 results are not truly representative of mitigation scenarios, and care must be taken when interpreting these results.
In the latter half of the 21st century, the IAMs place less emphasis on energy intensity improvement, as more options for decarbonizing energy sources become increasingly available (see also Krey et al. 2013 ). This feature is clearly seen in the difference in energy intensity between the Base FullTech and 450 FullTech scenarios (Fig. 2) . The difference in energy intensity between the baseline and policy scenarios narrows after around 2050, resulting in Ushaped curves. In contrast, the divergence in carbon intensity, defined as CO 2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry divided by final energy consumption, continues to widen for almost all models, as indicated by the monotonically decreasing curves. This tendency is also fairly robust across major regions and sectors (see Figs. S4, S5, and S6).
Figure 3 compares the energy intensity improvements for each scenario by model for the period 2010-2050, when energy intensity reductions are significant. Partial equilibrium models are indicated with "PE" symbols. In the Base FullTech and Base LowEI scenarios, the EIIRs are set by the EMF27 scenario protocol. There are some variations, as allowed in the protocol, but no bias due to model type is found; "PE" symbols in the upper panel of Fig. 3 are shown scattered around the entire range. percentage points per year for the 450 FullTech scenario. As noted above, the efficiency potentials of partial equilibrium models are limited by represented technologies; once such options are fully utilized, additional efficiency improvement is scarce. In the 550 FullTech and 550 LowEI scenarios, general equilibrium models tend to show larger changes in EIIRs than partial equilibrium models, which suggests the importance of structural changes in the economy for large declines in energy intensity, i.e., a shift towards a less energy-intensive, service-based economy. An alternative interpretation is that some general equilibrium models have limited decarbonization options, and hence their reliance on demand-side responses. Interpretation of the 450 cases is not straightforward because some models are reporting infeasibility. Focusing only on models with feasible solutions may result in a biased estimate (Tavoni and Tol 2010) .
Note that the middle and lower panels of Fig. 3 describe the additional EIIRs for the 550 ppm-eq and 450 ppm-eq climate targets, relative to those from the baselines.
There is no clear relationship between the additional EIIRs (lower two panels of Fig. 3 ) and the representation of end-use technologies, rebound effects, and barriers (Tables 1 and  S1 ). This result is understandable since EIIRs of models depend not just on energy efficiency representation but also on the opportunities for decarbonization and other mitigation potentials, which widely vary among models. Figure S9 examines EIIRs in the European Union (EU), the United States of America (USA), China, and India. In the Base FullTech scenario, developing regions show higher EIIRs, as specified in the protocol, but models achieve specified energy efficiency in various ways on a regional scale. Uncertainties are large for China and India. The Base LowEI scenario assumes larger EIIRs as predetermined in the study protocol, but the strategies used by IAMs to achieve this are regionally heterogeneous.
Regional and sectoral decomposition
Under climate policy, changes in EIIRs are larger in emerging economies than in industrialized regions, although the differences in the median EIIR between emerging and industrialized regions are smaller than in the baselines. Thus, models suggest that emerging economies offer large potentials for energy efficiency, but a great deal of the potential is embedded in the baseline scenario.
We next analyze sectoral contributions to energy intensity improvements. Ideally one would like to examine the final energy consumption per unit service demand, but such data are only available for a few models and a limited set of sectors. Instead, we examine the final energy consumption for each sector per unit GDP.
Sectoral decomposition of the Base FullTech scenario in Fig. 4 shows that in terms of medians, the residential and commercial sector has the largest energy intensity improvement potential, albeit with large uncertainties. Each IAM achieves energy efficiency with different sectoral strategies. Contributions to the Base LowEI from the three sectors are roughly even.
EIIR differences between the 550 FullTech and the Base FullTech scenarios reveal that industry is most responsive to a moderate climate policy. When analyzing the 450 FullTech scenario, significant efficiency improvements are seen in the transportation sector; a higher carbon price is generally required to induce energy efficiency in this sector, compared to the other two (Figs. S10 and S11). Examination of changes in final energy by fuel type in this sector implies that the introduction of electric vehicles plays a role (Figs. S12, S13, and S14). Uncertainties in the 450 FullTech scenario are substantial, suggesting different strategies from the various models.
Technical substitution and service intensity improvement
Energy intensity is a macroeconomic measurement, and it declines either because of technical efficiency and/or structural changes in the economy. In the following, we conduct a further decomposition of the transportation sector, for which a subset of models provide necessary variables, in order to identify the roles of the two factors.
Transport energy intensity can be decomposed as:
where TFE is the total final energy consumption in the transportation sector, and ASD is an aggregate energy service demand, and t represents time. TFE/ASD depends on energy efficiency of transportation technologies. TFE/ASD is thus termed the technical energy intensity. ASD/GDP is called the service intensity. Calculating the aggregated transport service demand (ASD) is not straightforward, because different types of services are usually expressed in differing units. We therefore convert the energy service demand into an energy unit before summation, by using the individual technical energy intensity of the service in the base year; the aggregated energy service is calculated as a weighted sum of transportation services using frozen, individual technical energy intensities 2 :
Here the subscript i denotes the type of transportation energy service and differs from model to model. SD i and FE are service demand and final energy consumption of a certain type of energy service, and w i is the weight. Note that
In the Base FullTech scenario, EIIRs fall into a small range (1.0 %/yr-1.5 %/yr) (Fig. 5) . However, there is a weak agreement on the sources of improvements. Some models (e.g. POLES and TIAM-WORLD) have high improvement rates of technical intensity and low improvement rates of service intensity, while some other models (e.g. DNE21+ and GCAM) have the opposite trend of a substantial service intensity improvement.
Results from policy scenarios imply that partial equilibrium models tend to rely on technical changes for energy intensity improvement and that a general equilibrium one favors service intensity improvement. The partial equilibrium models (e.g. AIM-Enduse, DNE21+, TIAM-WORLD, POLES) tend to move downwards whereas one of the general equilibrium models (BET) tends to move to the left. The finding here is consistent with the general features of the two model types, as discussed in relation to Fig. 3 .
In the efficiency scenario (Base LowEI), the energy intensity is broadly improved as compared to the Base FullTech scenario. However, models achieve the improvement in different ways, depending on how the efficiency scenario is implemented by the individual model. Small rebound effects (increases of energy service demand resulting from technical energy improvements) are observed for both GCAM and TIAM-WORLD.
Response to carbon price
We next examine the relationship between energy intensity and carbon price across different scenarios (Fig. S15 ). There is a huge variation in carbon price across models. Carbon prices are closely linked with energy prices (Figs. S16 and S17), and energy efficiency is motivated by increasing energy prices. The slope of the line indicates the responsiveness of each model to the increasing carbon price, and the response varies substantially across models. The uncertainty in responsiveness implies that IAMs employ various combinations of decarbonization and energy intensity in order to meet the climate targets. value seems very large, but since a number of models suggest infeasibility for this case, the required EIIR in this case is likely to be higher than the SE4ALL target.
Conclusions and discussion
We have reviewed the state of energy efficiency modeling in IAMs, demonstrating that an increasing number of integrated assessment models incorporate energy efficiency barriers and rebound effects in various ways. Collectively, the EMF27 dataset can be considered as a reasonable model ensemble to explore energy efficiency potentials. We have computed the time evolution of energy intensity, confirming that in the short term, the global energy intensity declines at a much faster rate under a stringent climate target than in the past. Energy efficiency is found to be more important in the short run than in the long run, as indicated by the energy intensity changes in policy scenarios from the baselines. Nevertheless, there is a great diversity in energy intensity reductions at the regional and sectoral levels.
Our results show that the SE4ALL's target of doubling the global EIIR is roughly consistent with the results from the EMF27 dataset for the 450 FullTech scenario. However, a doubling may not be sufficient when key technologies are constrained.
Our analysis has touched on how partial and general equilibrium models differ in terms of representing energy efficiency. General equilibrium models show larger, additional improvement rates of energy intensity under climate policy. An inspection of the relative contributions of service intensity and technological intensity has clarified similar differences in the transportation sector between partial and general equilibrium models.
This study leaves many questions unanswered. The decline of energy intensity in response to an increase in carbon price varies significantly across models, and as yet we have not deciphered the sources of such a wide divergence. Although we showed that many contemporary IAMs incorporate energy efficiency barriers in one way or another, their quantitative implications are not explored. Wada et al. (2012) and Murphy and Jaccard (2011) conducted such analyses, using global and regional models respectively. Likewise, only a small number of studies on the size of rebound effects in a global IAM or energy-economic model have been conducted to this date. Although such analyses are possible with the EMF27 dataset, they remain the subject of future work.
